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Abstract 
The paper examines the impact of executive ownership and other ownership and governance 
factors on employment change after takeovers.  Drawing on a dataset of 235 takeovers, the 
results show that there is a reduction in employment in just over half of cases.  Higher levels of 
executive share ownership are associated with lower probabilities of employee lay-offs post-
takeover, and there is a positive relationship between executive ownership and employment 
growth.  The effect of executive options on employment change is generally insignificant, as are 
the effects of other features of ownership and governance.  The evidence suggests that executives 
with higher levels of ownership tend to mount takeovers of better performing firms and to 
implement takeovers aimed at growth. 
 
1 Introduction 
Mergers and acquisitions (M&A) are controversial because of their perceived adverse effects on 
employment.  These transactions are often followed by restructuring, divestments, and plant 
shutdowns, leading to lay-offs and reductions in employment (Conyon et al. 2001; 2002a; Lehto 
and Böckerman 2008).  They can have catastrophic consequences for workers, especially when 
large-scale reductions occur in localities where alternative employment opportunities are limited.  
Equally, there is some evidence of employment growth after takeovers, especially when 
divestments (job transfers) are taken out of the equation (Denis 1994).  A key question concerns 
the factors associated with employment change after M&A.  Why do some transactions result in 
declines in employment whilst others are followed by employment growth?   
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The role of executive ownership and other ownership and governance factors in 
explaining these outcomes is tested and evaluated in this paper.  Recent Industrial Relations 
literature has suggested that corporate governance and ownership can have a substantial impact 
on the labour effects of mergers and acquisitions and their aftermath (Gospel and Pendleton 
2003; Armour et al. 2003).  But as yet there has been little empirical scrutiny of this particular 
issue though there has been a long tradition of research into the employment effects of M & A 
(Brown and Medoff 1988; Shleifer and Summers 1988; Conyon et al. 2002a).   
Ownership and governance can be predicted to have various effects on employment 
change after takeovers.  The significance of executive ownership is that it potentially aligns 
executive interests with those of shareholders.  High levels of executive ownership could be 
associated with employment reductions after takeovers because a stake in the results of the post-
merger company provides an incentive to recoup takeover costs by reducing employment costs.  
A further possibility is that executive ownership will lead to employment reductions in certain 
circumstances such as where the target company has had poor performance prior to the takeover.  
Alternatively, executive ownership could be associated with employment growth because 
ownership can provide an incentive to grow the firm.  It is possible that executives with 
ownership mount takeovers where there are perceived to be good growth prospects.  Equally, 
they may avoid takeovers aimed at rationalisation and restructuring because of the potential risk 
to their wealth should rationalisation not succeed.  In other words, loss aversion influences the 
kind of takeovers that are mounted by executives with ownership, and this impacts upon the level 
of employment after the takeover.  A rather different argument for predicting employment 
stability or growth after takeovers is that executive ownership entrenches managerial control, 
with executives using this protection from shareholders to build alliances with labour and to 
pursue empire-building strategies.    
Executive share options may have the opposite effect in so far as they provide a right to 
future returns but not current control rights, and have no downside risk.  They may encourage 
managers to embark on high risk strategies such as large-scale rationalisation and restructuring, 
leading to substantial contraction of employment.  As for other shareholders, a single large bloc-
holder may be unlikely to seek employment reductions because, in so far as a large bloc holder is 
an ‘insider’, there may be a greater appreciation of the value of human capital and close 
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relationships with other insiders (Jackson 2005: van Essen et al. 2012).  A large bloc holder may 
also secure private benefits from controlling a larger and growing firm (Barclay and Holderness, 
1989).  Where there are several large shareholders a greater focus on shareholder wealth might 
be anticipated, and this might be associated with employment reductions to recoup the cost of the 
takeover (Shleifer and Vishny, 1986).        
In the paper we empirically examine the relationship between ownership and 
employment change after mergers and acquisitions, focusing especially on the impact of 
executive ownership.  It is based on a study of 235 takeovers amongst British listed companies 
taking place between 1990 and 2000, supplemented by data drawn from a control sample of 470 
non-merging firms, matched by industry, size and pre-takeover performance (Barber and Lyon 
1996; Loughran and Ritter 1997).  The paper examines the factors associated with employment 
growth and decline within one and three years of the transaction and with lay-off 
announcements.  In the first place the results show that employment reductions are far from 
universal.  By the end of the first year after the transaction, there is an average reduction of 
employment of 2.6 per cent per company, with a reduction occurring in 54 per cent of cases.  
Employment reductions are concentrated in merged companies that divest some operations after 
the takeover: when companies making divestments are excluded, there is average employment 
growth of 4 per cent after one year (c.f. Denis 1994).   Lay-offs are announced in the first year 
post-takeover in 43 per cent of cases (28 per cent when divestment cases are excluded) but in 12 
per cent of these lay-off effects are counter-balanced by employment growth.     
Our main finding is that executive share ownership is a significant influence on post-
transaction employment change.  Higher levels of executive ownership are associated with lower 
probabilities of lay-offs.  There are positive and sizeable relationships between executive 
ownership and employment change.  These results hold whether or not we include cases where 
divestments take place.  The effects of options and ownership by other bloc holders are far less 
strong.  Although the results are often in the direction predicted, the coefficients are insignificant 
in nearly all instances.      
Since the effects of executive ownership are so pronounced, further analysis in the paper 
mainly concentrates on this form of ownership.  We examine whether the relationship between 
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executive ownership and employment change is curvilinear, based on the findings in the 
literature that ownership has strong non-linear effects on performance (Bos et al. 2012; Cosh et 
al. 2006; Morck et al. 1988; Short and Keasey 1999).  We find little evidence to support this 
perspective in the case of employment change: the relationship is broadly linear throughout the 
distribution of executive ownership.      
We further consider whether the effects of managerial ownership are moderated by the 
context and various features of the takeover.  In some circumstances, managerial ownership 
might be anticipated to have positive effects whereas in others the incentives effects of 
ownership might lead to negative effects on employment.  We find little evidence to support this 
as most interaction terms are insignificant.  The exceptions are significant interactions with 
takeover premia, the relative size of target companies, and diversification takeovers.  We 
attribute these findings to selection effects.   
A key question concerns the reasons for the consistently positive relationship between 
executive ownership and employment change.  One possibility is that increasing ownership 
insulates top managers from shareholders and enables them to create ‘insider alliances’ with 
workers.  Whilst we cannot rule out alliances of this sort, there is little evidence to suggest that 
entrenchment is an important explanation for our findings.  The signs on the coefficients of the 
other ownership variables are typically the same as the executive ownership coefficients.  
Another possibility is that executives with ownership incentives mount takeovers that are more 
likely to lead to employment growth.  We find stronger evidence in support of this selection 
argument.  Executive owners mount takeovers of firms with better relative labour productivity, 
and tend to mount takeovers aimed at growth rather than rationalisation.   We attribute this to 
risk aversion.  As undiversified investors with wealth at risk, executives seek to avoid those 
takeovers that may adversely affect their wealth. 
To the best of our knowledge, these results for ownership and governance are novel: we 
are unaware of any previous studies on the effects of ownership and options on employment in 
the UK after takeovers.  They refine our understanding of the employment effects of takeovers, 
and highlight factors that are associated with job loss and growth.   They counter the view that 
use of instruments that are said to align managers with shareholder interests will typically have 
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negative impacts on labour.  The significance for policy and practice of our results is that as 
ownership by executives is increasingly promoted in the UK, in place of other instruments such 
as stock options, the effects of takeovers may come to have more benign effects on labour in the 
longer term.  In the context of the current policy debate in the UK about takeover regulation, our 
evidence is consistent with the view that further regulation may not be necessary to protect 
labour’s interests, at least as far as takeovers by UK listed firms are concerned.      
In the next section we provide background material on the role of ownership and 
governance in influencing employment change after takeovers.  We then outline the data sources 
and variables, and then present the results of multivariate analysis.  In the final section we 
consider the implications of the findings and the limitations of our approach.   
 
2 Background: theory and evidence 
There is an extensive literature on the employment effects of takeovers in the USA and the UK, 
reflecting the large relative size of the listed company sector in these countries and an 
accompanying high level of M&A involving large firms (Rossi and Volpin 2004).  The  evidence 
suggests that employment reductions often follow M&A (Deakin and Slinger 1997; Lehto and 
Böckerman 2008), though it is not always clear whether this arises from job transfers or job 
destruction.  There is a wide variety of explanations for post-takeover employee layoffs and 
employment reduction after takeovers in the literature.  One influential view suggests that 
acquirers target under-performing firms so as to reallocate resources to more efficient users 
(Manne 1965).   Restructuring is therefore likely to occur after takeovers.  On this basis the 
performance of target companies prior to takeover is expected to predict employment reductions 
after the transaction, and there is certainly supportive evidence (Hillier et al. 2007; Coucke et al. 
2007; O’Shaughnessy and Flanagan 1997; Krishnan et al 2007).  Other studies highlight the 
extent of similarity between target and acquirer.  Where related businesses are acquired, there 
appears to be scope for rationalisation of duplicated activities.  Relatedness has predicted lay-off 
announcements post-takeover (O’Shaughnessy and Flanagan 1998), workforce reductions 
(Krishnan et al 2007), and reductions in labour demand (Conyon et al. 2002a, 2002b; Gugler and 
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Yurtoglu 2004).  Hostile takeovers also commonly lead to employment reductions (Denis 1994), 
often because they are aimed at major restructuring of target companies and because high 
premiums are necessary to buy-off target company shareholders (Sudansanam and Mahate 2006; 
Goergen and Renneboog 2004).  They have been said to lead to a ‘breach of trust’, whereby 
implicit contracts between companies and workers are broken (Shleifer and Summers 1988).      
The role of ownership incentives in influencing employment change after takeovers has 
rarely been empirically investigated despite the central role of these incentives in corporate 
governance theory over many years (Filatotchev et al. 2000).  Agency and managerialist theories 
have argued that top managers without ownership will seek to grow their firms beyond the 
optimum size for shareholders, incentivized by wages, perks, and desire for status that are 
primarily linked to organizational size (Jensen 1986; Jensen and Meckling 1976; Marris 1964).   
A central claim is that managers will embark on mergers and acquisitions to expand their 
empires (Jensen and Murphy 1990).  Having acquired new companies, these managers will resist 
downsizing and restructuring (Dial and Murphy 1995).   
Providing managers with ownership is predicted to align their incentives with 
shareholders and to limit self-serving behavior.  Managerial ownership may have a number of 
effects on takeovers and employment.  It may make managers less enthusiastic to mount 
takeovers in the first place on the grounds that takeovers are thought to be value-destroying.    
There is some evidence from the US to support this argument (Sanders 2001).   Ownership may 
also lead managers to mount takeovers with certain characteristics.  Executives with an 
ownership stake may take-over better performing companies or those with better growth 
prospects rather than those that require extensive restructuring.   
Once takeovers have taken place, the effects of managerial ownership on employment 
can have contradictory effects.  On the one hand, managerial owners may embark on 
employment-reducing rationalization with a view to enhancing shareholder wealth.  They may 
seek to recoup the costs of the takeover by in effect transferring them to labour.  Krishnan et al 
(2007) found that the premia paid to mount takeovers is the main predictor of employment 
reductions post-takeover, and it could be predicted that executives with ownership will be 
especially concerned to recoup these costs.  On the other hand, ownership provides managers 
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with an incentive to grow the firm so as to benefit from increases in value.  They will also seek 
to avoid value loss, and this may weigh more heavily than the possibility of securing gains 
(Kahneman and Tversky 1979), especially as executives are typically undiversified investors 
with their human capital highly correlated with their ownership wealth.  Given that lay-offs and 
employment contractions are known to have negative impacts on share price in many 
circumstances (Datta et al. 2010), executives with ownership will usually avoid actions that lead 
to lay-offs and employment reductions.  Indeed, asymmetric risk aversion may mean that 
executives with ownership will mount takeovers of firms that are seen to be a less risky prospect 
(eg. they are better performers and/or do not require extensive rationalization).      
A further possibility is that the control rights associated with executive ownership may 
protect managers against shareholder discipline.  These entrenched managers use their power to 
secure ‘private’ benefits, such as various perks, which are typically associated with 
organizational size.  They may also choose to side with workers as fellow ‘insiders’.  A more 
complex prediction is that ownership effects are non-linear.  The performance literature has 
drawn attention to opposing effects of alignment and entrenchment arising from ownership 
(Morck et al. 1989; Short and Keasey 1999; Cosh et al. 2006).   At low levels of executive 
ownership, return rights are likely to predominate as control rights relative to other shareholders 
will be low, and thus alignment effects will be strong.  As the level of ownership increases, there 
will be diminishing returns whilst control rights will become more potent.  Thus, entrenchment 
effects may come to predominate, with managers able to use their control rights to protect 
‘private interests’, such as a ‘quiet life’ characterized by harmonious relationships with labour.   
There is ample evidence from the performance literature that managerial ownership has non-
linear effects (Cosh et al. 2006).  There is also some evidence from the labour literature: 
Cronqvist et al. (2009) find that managers with substantial control rights pay higher wages but 
that this is mitigated by return rights, whilst Filatotchev et al. (2000) find evidence of non-linear 
effects of managerial ownership on post-privatization downsizing in former Soviet countries.  
The implication in the current context is that at low levels of ownership managers may be more 
likely to instigate lay-offs and reduce employment if required but that at higher levels they will 
be less likely to reduce employment.      
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Stock options may have rather different effects on lay-offs and employment reductions 
post-takeover (Sanders 2001).  There are two reasons for this. One is that options do not provide 
control or returns during the vesting and exercise period.  During this period managerial attention 
is likely to focus on the potential return rights attainable at maturity and exercise.  For this reason 
the entrenchment effects of options are likely to be minimal.  The second reason is that the risk 
properties of options are very different from those of share ownership.  Options protect their 
holders from downside risk, and for this reason are likely to encourage them to take riskier 
actions.  This might take the form of larger bets with higher variance (Sanders and Hambrick 
2007).  In the context of takeovers there are several implications.  First, executives with options 
may be more likely to mount high risk actions such as takeovers in the first place, as is borne out 
by US evidence (Sanders 2001).  It may also encourage them to embark on riskier takeovers or to 
adopt risker strategies during takeovers (Tufano 1996).  Post-takeover, options may encourage 
holders to reduce employment so as to recoup the costs of takeovers and enhance shareholder 
wealth, even though there may be a high risk that these actions will have adverse consequences 
on the share price.  An important consideration here is that negative share price returns will be 
concentrated in the period immediately around the employment reductions or lay-offs whilst the 
options may not be exercisable until some point further in the future.  Thus, option holders will 
not suffer immediate reductions in their wealth, unlike shareholders.     
Although stock ownership and options are often seen as the most effective way of 
reducing the agency costs arising from the separation of ownership and control (Hall and 
Liebman 1998), there are other means of encouraging managers to operate in shareholders’ 
interests.  The presence of non-executive directors provides for the articulation of shareholder 
interests in the boardroom, especially where these directors are clearly independent of the firm 
and its management (Perry and Shivdasani, 2005).  Corporate governance reforms over a twenty 
year period in the UK have given a primary role in corporate governance to non-executive 
directors, and over time their position and numbers (as a proportion of the total board) have been 
enhanced.  However, evidence on their effectiveness is inconclusive (Denis and McConnell 
2003; Hermalin and Weisbach, 2003; Bebchuk and Weisbach 2010), though higher proportions 
of non-executives have been found to be more effective (Mura 2007).  How the presence of non-
executives should impact upon employment change or stability after takeovers is not obvious.  
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The extant evidence (Krishnan et al. 2007) shows that the proportion of non-executives is an 
insignificant predictor of post-takeover workforce reductions.                 
 Substantial shareholders may also influence employment change after takeovers.  The 
norm in countries with ‘liberal market’ systems of corporate governance, such as Britain, is for 
shareholdings in large listed companies to be small and widely dispersed.  Consequently, the 
norm has been that most institutional shareholders (typically the largest shareholders in the larger 
firms) do not play an active role in governance (Gillan and Starks 2007; Bebchuk and Weisbach 
2010), though there is evidence of ‘behind the scenes’ informal contact with company managers 
(Black and Coffee 1994).  However, larger shareholders have a greater incentive and capacity to 
influence management decisions.  Where there is a large bloc-holder it might be anticipated that 
employment reductions are less likely because, in so far as a large bloc holder is an ‘insider’, 
there may be a greater appreciation of the value of human capital and good relationships with 
employees (Jackson 2005) and because a large bloc holder may also secure private benefits from 
controlling a larger and growing firm (Barclay and Holderness, 1989).  By contrast, where there 
are several large shareholders a greater focus on shareholder wealth might be anticipated, and 
this might be associated with employment reductions to recoup the cost of the takeover.  
However, extant evidence suggests that institutional ownership has insignificant effects on 
downsizing (Filatotchev et al. 2000).  One possibility is that selection effects are important: 
larger shareholders are able to prevent managers mounting takeovers that might subsequently 
lead to lay-offs and contraction.             
In the remainder of the paper we assess the role of ownership and governance in 
influencing lay-offs and changes in employment at company level after takeovers.  Using a 
sample of UK takeovers, we examine both lay-off announcements and actual employment 
change at one and three years after the transaction.  Several questions are addressed, based on the 
preceding discussion of the literature.  One, what are the employment outcomes of takeovers?  
Two, what effects do executive ownership, executive options, and other forms of substantial 
ownership have on lay-offs and employment?  Three, to what extent does executive ownership 
have linear effects on employment after takeovers?  Four, are the effects of executive ownership 
moderated by circumstances and characteristics of the takeover?  Five, do executive and other 
forms of ownership influence the type of takeovers that are mounted?         
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To address these questions the following analyses are conducted: first, probit estimations 
of the probability of lay-offs; second, OLS analysis of the relationship between the various 
explanatory factors and employment change, both positive and negative.  Tests are conducted for 
the potential non-linear effects of ownership.  To highlight the potentially asymmetric effects on 
employment growth and decline, the sample is split into workforce growth and reduction sub-
samples in parts of the analysis.  Finally, we conduct a further series of regressions to assess 
whether ownership effects are contingent on various aspects of the takeover transaction and pre-
takeover performance, and also to evaluate whether selection effects have a role in explaining the 
results observed.     
 
3 Research methods 
Sample 
The initial population for the study is all takeovers of firms listed on the London Stock 
Exchange by London-listed companies during the period 1990-2000.  As Table 1 indicates there 
were 777 takeovers of this sort during the period: there were a further 388 takeovers mounted by 
foreign companies.  We exclude foreign acquisitions from consideration because of severe data 
availability problems post-takeover, though we accept that this possibly introduces a bias to our 
sample.  From the population of UK domestic takeovers we select a sample excluding takeovers 
with the following characteristics: (1) acquisitions of less than 50 per cent of target shares; (2) 
takeovers by private or newly established companies, including management buy-outs and 
acquisitions by private equity or venture capital firms; (3) takeovers involving property 
management, financial (banks, investment trusts etc) and utility companies
i
.   This reduces the 
potential sample size from 777 to 402 takeovers.  We then exclude takeovers undertaken by 
serial or multiple acquirers, or where there are data availability problems.  Only one acquisition 
per acquirer within any three consecutive years has been included in the sample, excluding 
acquirers that undertake any further large M&A (for example, acquisition of another UK publicly 
listed firm) during the three post-takeover years.  Consequently, any employment growth 
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observed in the sample can be attributed to organic growth rather than further acquisitions.   This 
gives a final sample of 235 takeovers.   
As can be derived from Table 1, the average value of takeover deals in the sample 
selected is just over 300 million (at 2003 prices).  This is somewhat higher than the population of 
takeovers by UK listed companies (average of 253 million) but approximately equal to the 
average value of all takeovers of UK listed companies.  The size distribution of takeovers (by 
acquirer size) is approximately normal with small proportions of very small (under 100 
employees) and very large firms (more than 100,000 employees) at each end of the distribution.  
Unsurprisingly, the distribution of acquired firms is skewed somewhat towards the lower end.  In 
the sample there are takeovers observed in 27 of 38 industrial sectors
ii
.  Our sample is broadly 
representative of the population of takeovers by UK listed companies with one important 
proviso: serial acquirers are excluded from our sample, with the result that some vibrant takeover 
sectors, such as pharma and bio-tech, are under-represented.  The sample includes firms that 
make divestments after takeovers.  Unfortunately it is not possible to calculate the employment 
effects of these divestments as companies do not publish this information.  We deal with this by 
reporting results for the full sample and for a reduced sample of 186 companies where cases 
involving divestment post-takeover are excluded. 
TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
     Data on sample takeovers of UK were obtained from Acquisitions Monthly, the main 
industry monitor of M&A in the UK.  These data include the names of merging firms, takeover 
announcement dates, takeover completion dates, premiums, takeover mode and payment mode.  
Operational and financial data, including the number of workers, staff costs, operating 
performance, and share price performance data were retrieved from Datastream and company 
accounts.  Seven years of data (three years before and three years after the takeover completion 
year) were collected for each case. Data on the board composition and share ownership of 
acquiring companies was collected from the Hambro Company Guide and the Price Waterhouse 
Corporate Register and refers to the ownership at the end of the last accounting year 
immediately prior to the takeover event.  
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Variable definitions 
i. Dependent variables 
To create the dependent variables we utilise data from two sources.  Data on lay-offs were 
collected from the Financial Times and other national newspapers, downloaded via the Nexis
®
 
database, following the methodology adopted in prior research (Hillier et al. 2007; Krishnan et 
al. 2007; O'Shaughnessy and Flanagan 1998)
 iii
.  Screening newspapers for a period of up to two 
years from the takeover completion date, we found media reports of employee layoffs in 101 (43 
per cent) out of 235 acquisitions
iv
.  Almost all of these lay-offs were announced within one year 
of the transaction completion.  Data on announced employee layoffs do not include workforce 
reductions arising from divestments.  They thus refer to reductions rather than transfers of 
employment.  This data is used to create an Employee layoffs dummy, which takes the value of 1 
if the acquirer is reported to be laying-off at least 1 per cent of the workforce of the merged firms 
within two years of the takeover.  
Second, using Datastream data we create employment change variables by comparing 
pre-takeover combined employment of the acquired and the acquiring firm with post-takeover 
employment of the acquiring firm.  First, we construct pre-takeover employment by combining 
the number of workers of the acquired and the acquiring firm on the payroll immediately before 
takeover (ie the figures reported in the annual reports immediately prior to the takeover event).  
Post-takeover employment is defined as the number of workers of the acquiring firm on its 
payroll during the post-takeover years (Year 1 or Year 3).  Then we compute the employment 
change one year (three years) after the transaction by subtracting the pre-takeover employment 
from the post-takeover employment in Year 1 (Year 3).  Following Davis et al. (2011), we divide 
the difference between post- and pre-takeover employment with their average value, to create a 
measure of percentage change that is symmetric either side of zero.  Two variables are created by 
this method: Employment change after one year and Employment change after three years
v
.  
ii. Independent variables: ownership and governance 
Executive share ownership is the percentage of ordinary shares owned by executive directors and 
their immediate family members whilst Non-executive ownership refers to shareholdings by non-
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executive directors and their families. Executive share options is the number of rights to shares 
awarded under executive share option schemes as a percentage of the acquirer’s total number of 
shares in issue. Mean (median) executive share ownership is 5.18 per cent (0.82 per cent) and 
non-executive mean (median) ownership is 1.32 per cent (0.09 per cent).  These ownership levels 
are similar to those reported in earlier UK research (Cosh et al. 2006; Sudarsanam et al. 1996).   
The External largest single owner refers to the largest non-board shareholding in excess 
of 3 per cent.  This shareholder has on average 10.53 per cent ownership (median = 8.85 per 
cent).  We also generate External large combined ownership to represent the sum of bloc 
holdings in excess of 3 per cent.  On average, 25.5 per cent shares are held by these shareholders 
(median = 23.17 per cent). The Proportion of non-executive directors is the number of non-
executive directors on the board divided by total board size. The average proportion is 0.44, 
similar to that reported in Cosh et al.(2006) and Yawson (2006), and is higher than the minimum 
proportion of one-third recommended by the Cadbury Committee in 1993
vi
.     
iii. Control variables 
Takeovers may promote synergy, which may in turn result in workforce reductions.  There is 
more scope for elimination of duplication when target and acquisition operate in the same sector, 
and relatedness has predicted lay-offs (O’Shaughnessy and Flanagan 1998), workforce 
reductions (Krishnan et al. 2007), and reductions in labour demand (Conyon et al. 2002a, 2002b; 
Gugler and Yurtoglu 2004).   Related acquisitions is a dummy set to 1 when the primary activity 
of both acquired and acquirer firms is in the same two digit industrial sector, as in Cosh et al. 
(2006).  A second, alternative measure is more sophisticated in that it attempts to incorporate the 
objectives and nature of the transaction.  A detailed search of newspaper articles in the Financial 
Times in a three-month period around the takeover generated information on the reasons for the 
takeover.   Based on managers’ accounts, and the newspaper’s interpretation of these, the data 
were classified by the research team into four types of mergers: diversification (11 per cent), 
horizontal growth (46 per cent), horizontal efficiency (27 per cent), and vertical integration (16 
per cent)
vii
.  These reasons are coded into three dummies with diversification as the reference 
category.       
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Acquired firms are generally smaller than their industry average whereas the converse is 
true for acquiring firms (Conyon et al. 2001; 2002a: McGuckin and Nguyen 2001).  Relative 
employment size is the ratio of employment in the acquired firm to the acquiring firm in the year 
immediately prior to takeover. The ratio shows that the median acquirer is about three times 
larger than the median acquired firm.   
The hostility of the takeover is an important control variable.  Hostile takeovers are 
integral to the ‘breach of trust’ perspective, which suggests that hostile takeovers lead to major 
wealth transfers from workers to shareholders via wage cuts and employment reductions 
(Shleifer and Summers 1988).   Hostile takeovers can be costly for the acquiring firm because 
larger premia are typically required (Sudarsanam and Mahate 2006), and lay-offs and workforce 
reductions may be instigated to pay for them.  Hostile acquisitions are those classified as hostile 
by Acquisitions Monthly on the basis of whether an initial bid was rejected by the target firm 
management (Franks and Mayer 1996), and is coded 0,1.  52 transactions (22 per cent of the 
sample) are classified as hostile in this way.  
There is some debate as to the role of acquisition share premia.  Krishnan et al. (2007) 
find that high premia are the main factor leading to post-acquisition workforce reductions, 
though other studies (such as Beckmann and Forbes 2004) find little relationship between the 
two.  The acquisition Premium is defined as the percentage difference between the purchase 
price and the market price of the acquired firm’s shares 30 days before the takeover, divided by 
the latter (Hayward and Hambrick 1997; Sirower 1997)
viii
.  
Takeovers are typically paid for by cash or shares, or some combination of the two.  In 
the UK approximately 80 per cent of acquisitions by listed companies are paid in cash, declining 
to around 60 per cent if the targets are also listed (Faccio and Masulis 2005).  Cash-paid 
acquisition refers to 100 per cent cash-paid deals. The remaining mixed or share-based deals are 
coded 0.   
Leverage is included as a control because debt restricts free cashflow, and therefore 
places constraints on managerial actions.  In general, firms with higher debt reduce employment 
more often (Hanka 1998).  However, evidence on the role of debt in post-takeover employment 
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changes is mixed: O’Shaughnessy and Flanagan (1998) find no evidence that debt-financed 
takeovers are more likely to announce lay-offs but Krishnan et al. (2007) find that debt 
significantly predicts workforce reductions.  Leverage is defined as the ratio of total debt to total 
assets at the end of the takeover completion year. 
Prior research shows that some post-takeover acquirers undertake large scale asset 
restructuring including, assets divestments and sell-offs (Franks and Mayer 1996; Haynes et al. 
2000; Maksimovic et al. 2011). For example, Maksimovic et al. (2011) report that acquirers sell 
27% and close 19% of the plants of target firms within three post-takeover years.  We control for 
acquirers’ divestment activity, using data on post-takeover asset divestments collected by 
screening Financial Times for a period of up to three years after the takeover completion year. 
Divestments refers to the acquirers that divest some of the acquired assets. 54 acquirers made 
significant divestments by the end of Year 1 and further 12 acquirers made divestments by the 
end of Year 3. 
Acquisitions in capital intensive industries may result in lower levels of workforce 
reductions than those in labour intensive industries, as such there may be less scope for labour 
efficiency improvements.  Thus, we control for Capital intensity, defined as the combined fixed 
asset values of the acquired and acquiring firm at the end the year immediately before the 
takeover completion, divided by the combined number of employees of the acquired and 
acquiring firm during that year.  We use the natural logarithmic transformation of this variable.   
As a further control for industry characteristics and economy-wide effects on 
employment, we use Change in control firm employment.  For this purpose, we select a sample 
of 470 non-merging control firms (Loughran and Ritter 1997; Barber and Lyon 1996).  There is a 
matched firm for each acquired and acquiring firm, selected according to industry (two digit), 
size (within a 25-200 per cent range) and pre-takeover performance criteria (the closest operating 
performance at the end of the year prior takeovers).  An important criterion for selection was that 
the matched firm was not involved in major acquisition activity two years before and three years 
after the sample takeover year.  Average employment for the matched firms is obtained by 
combining the number of employees of the acquired firm match and the acquiring firm match.  
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Control firm employment change is calculated for the same period as the dependent variable in 
each case, using the same methodology as above.  
The evidence suggests that pre-takeover performance of acquisition targets has an impact 
on post-transaction employment change (Hillier et al. 2007; Coucke et al. 2007).  As a measure 
of pre-takeover operating performance of acquired and acquiring firms we use Return on Assets 
(ROA), defined as Earnings before Interest, Taxes and Depreciation divided by book value of 
Total Assets at the beginning of the year. In order to control for industry-wide performance 
changes, we use industry-adjusted ROA, created by subtracting the relevant performance 
measure of the median firm in the same industry from the firm performance. This variable is not 
normally distributed, but negative values arising from the adjustment process preclude 
logarithmic transformation.  Instead we use the median of three year pre-takeover industry- 
adjusted performance.  These procedures create Pre-takeover Target ROA and Pre-takeover 
Acquirer ROA.  A further performance variable is created using the same approach for the year 
immediately after the takeover completion year: Post-takeover Acquirer ROA. 
Labour productivity performance is relevant to lay-offs and employment change: 
O’Shaughnessy and Flanagan (1998) find that lay-offs occur where the productivity of target 
companies is less than that of their acquirers, whilst Krishnan et al. (2007) show that workforce 
reductions are predicted by pre-takeover productivity.  Sales per employee are the measure of 
labour productivity in the acquired and acquiring firms.  We compute each acquired and 
acquiring firm’s labour productivity in the year prior to takeover completion and then scale them 
using their industry’s median labour productivity for the same period.  As these relative labour 
productivity performance measures are positively skewed, we take their natural logarithmic 
transformation to create Target Labour Productivity and Acquirer Labour Productivity. 
To create Target Average Wage and Acquirer Average Wage we divide each firm’s total 
staff costs by their number of employees in the year prior to takeover completion.  Then we scale 
each firm’s average wage using the industry median wage for the same period. As this relative 
average wage is positively skewed, its natural logarithmic transformation is used.  
  
17 
 
Appendix 1 provides further information on variable construction whilst Appendix 2 
includes a correlation matrix.   
 
4. Findings 
The extent of employment change 
Descriptive statistics are provided in Table 2.  As well as providing information for the 
full sample, this table reports statistics for two sub-samples according to post-takeover changes 
in employment numbers: ‘the workforce reduction’ sub-sample (‘WFR’ hereafter), where post-
merger combined employment levels decline relative to the pre- takeover employment level, and 
‘the workforce growth’ sub-sample (‘WFG’ hereafter), where post-merger employment levels 
grow relative to the pre-merger employment level in the first year after the takeover completion 
year.  
TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
As Table 2 shows, by the end of the first year after the transaction there is a net reduction 
in employment in 54 per cent of cases (127/235).  The average reduction in employment across 
companies is 2.6 per cent (median = 2.08 per cent) by the end of Year 1 and 9.2 per cent (median 
= 8.17 per cent) by the end of Year 3
ix
.  The actual change in employment by the end of Year 1 is 
a reduction of 185,113 employees, 4.8 per cent of the initial combined workforce of 3,854,481  
(approximately 15 per cent of the employed UK workforce in 2000).  The median employment 
reduction in companies making net reductions in employment is 14.39 per cent whilst the 
corresponding increase for employment growth companies is 16.03 per cent. Lay-offs are 
announced in 43 per cent of cases (101/235) but in 12 per cent (12/101) of these the effects are 
counter-balanced by employment growth.   
But it is important to qualify this picture of employment change.  Employment reductions 
are concentrated in merged companies that divest some operations after the takeover: when 
companies making divestments are excluded, there is average employment growth of 3.9 per 
cent per company after one year (median = 2.29 per cent), declining to a mean of 0.13 per cent 
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after three years (median = 1.68 per cent).   Thus, although takeovers as a whole lead on average 
to negative employment change in post-merger companies, this does not necessarily imply job 
loss in the economy more widely.  Where divestments take place, jobs are transferred rather than 
destroyed, though it is also the case that post-merger firms making divestments also tend to make 
lay-offs.         
Of course, an issue is the extent to which these employment changes are due to the M&A 
transaction. To investigate this we use the Average Treatment effect on the Treated (ATE) 
method (Wooldridge, 2002).  The principle behind this is that if the decision to merge is purely 
random, then the difference between employment growth in the merging and non-merging firms 
should reveal the causal effect of mergers on employment.  To estimate the effects of mergers we 
compare employment growth in merging firms with that in non-merging firms, controlling for 
size, prior performance, capital intensity, wage and industry. The ATE method matches several 
non-merging firms to each acquirer, on the basis of pre-determined pre-takeover characteristics, 
and estimates the difference in the employment growth with and without mergers.  The ATE 
estimates, given in Appendix 3, show that when the full sample is used mergers do not 
significantly change the workforce after either a 1 year or 3 year period, though the sign is the 
same as in the raw estimates. However, when observations with divestment are excluded, then 
the results show mergers and acquisitions lead to greater workforce growth in comparison to 
non-merging firms after 3 years.    
Determinants of post-merger lay-offs  
To consider the relationship between ownership and lay-offs after takeovers, we run a set of 
probit regressions where lay-off announcements are the dependent, binary variable.  Table 3 
reports the coefficients and marginal effects (for each variable when the others are held at their 
mean).  Various models are presented to identify the effects of ownership and governance 
variables.  Model 1 reports the baseline regression including Executive Share Ownership and 
Executive Options.  Model 2 removes Executive Options whilst Model 3 includes them in place 
of Executive Share Ownership.  Model 4 substitutes External Large Combined Ownership for 
External Largest Single Owner.  Model 5 replaces the variable for related acquisitions based on 
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SIC codes with a set of dummies capturing the objectives of the takeover.  Model 6 excludes 
those cases where divestments occur after the takeover.     
TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE 
Before reporting detailed results for the key variables of interest, it is worth noting that 
the results are generally fairly stable between the alternative specifications, though model fit 
improves somewhat with the substitution of the dummies for takeover objectives in place of 
Related Acquisitions.  Turning to performance first, profitability performance is not significantly 
related to the probability of lay-offs except in three models.  Neither labour productivity nor 
relative wage levels, in either the target or acquirer, have significant effects on the probability of 
lay-offs.  Contrary to previous findings (Conyon et al. 2002a; Krishnan et al. 2007; 
O'Shaughnessy and Flanagan 1998), related acquisitions do not have a higher probability of lay-
offs.  The substitution of the dummies for takeover motives in Models 5 and 6 refines these 
results.  Mergers undertaken to achieve rationalisation within an industry (Horizontal efficiency) 
are significantly associated with the probability of lay-offs post-takeover, and the marginal 
effects are sizeable.  Divestment is significantly associated with the probability of lay-offs, with 
sizeable marginal effects, confirming that those firms making lay-offs also tend to be divesting 
parts of the combined company shortly after the transaction.   The fact that the coefficient and 
marginal effects for Divestment reduce by around 20 per cent when the dummy for Horizontal 
efficiency is inserted (Model 5) reinforces this interpretation
x
   Relative employment size is 
significant at p<0.01 or better in all models, indicating that a smaller difference in size between 
acquirer and target affects the probability of lay-offs and employment reductions
xi
.   There are no 
significant differences in the probability of lay-offs arising from hostile acquisitions, contrary to 
the ‘breach of trust’ perspective (Shleifer and Summers 1988).   By contrast, higher levels of 
leverage have significant and sizeable effects on the probabilities of lay-offs, presumably 
because debt repayment and servicing requirements necessitate cost savings (O'Shaughnessy and 
Flanagan 1998).   
Each set of models in Table 3 report different specifications of ownership and 
governance.  All apart from Model 3, where executive ownership is not included, clearly show 
that executive share ownership is negatively related to the probability of lay-offs, though the 
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magnitude of effects is not large.   By contrast, the signs on Executive share options are negative 
but insignificant in all models.  Turning to the role of other shareholders, the results show 
generally negative relationships with lay-offs.  External largest single owner has insignificant 
effects on the probability of lay-off announcements, as does External large combined ownership  
A higher proportion of non-executive directors has a significant negative and substantial effect 
on the probability of lay-offs in all models apart from Models 3 and 6
xii
.   Meanwhile, ownership 
by non-executives has very small and insignificant relationships with lay-offs: this is 
unsurprising given that in most cases non-executives have low levels of ownership (median = 
0.09 per cent).    
 The headline finding then in Table 3 is that the larger the size of executive share 
ownership the lower the probability of lay-offs.  Although the data used allows us to say little 
about managerial motivations, the findings presented in the table indicate little support for the 
entrenchment argument because the coefficient signs are the same for all ownership and 
governance measures, with higher proportions of non-executives significantly associated with 
lower probability of lay-offs.  In other words, shareholders and shareholder representatives 
appear to be taking the same stance as executive managers.    
 
Employment change 
The analysis so far provides an indication of the factors associated with the probabilities of lay-
offs.  In this section, OLS models are used to investigate the relationship between ownership and 
governance to actual workforce change in the year immediately after the takeover (Table 4) and 
after three years (Table 5).  Several models are analysed.  In Models 1, 3, 4, and 6 the full sample 
is used.  In Models 2 and 5 cases where divestment is known to have occurred are excluded so 
that the employment change variable captures job loss (as opposed to job transfer) more 
precisely.  Models 7 and 8 are based on two sub-samples: those transactions leading to workforce 
reduction and those leading to workforce growth.  The sample is split in this way because the 
effects of the independent variables may be asymmetric.  This approach is repeated in Models 9 
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and 10 but with divestment cases excluded.  In these models the headline finding is clear: 
executive share ownership is positively associated with employment growth.    
TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE 
Models 1-6 in Table 4 report results for the whole sample at the end of the first year after 
takeover when the dependent variable includes both positive and negative values.  Most models 
show that the profitability performance of the acquirer and the acquired firm prior to takeover 
have a positive relationship with employment change.   Pre-takeover productivity appears to 
have no bearing on employment change but pre-takeover relative wage levels in the target 
company exhibit a significant negative relationship with employment changes post-takeover. 
Neither Related acquisitions nor takeover objectives have a significant effect on employment 
change but the relative size of the target continues to have a significant negative effect in some 
specifications.  Other transaction variables tend to have insignificant relationships with 
employment change.  Hostile acquisitions and Cash acquisitions are insignificant in all but one 
model, whilst Premium is insignificant throughout.  Leverage is insignificant in the full sample 
but has sizeable negative effects when divestment cases are removed.  This variability in this 
result seems to be due to a high correlation between leverage and divestment.  This is entirely 
plausible: firms that incur high levels of debt in mounting takeovers are likely to sell-off assets to 
reduce the debt, as well as reduce employment  
Turning to governance and ownership, executive share ownership has a significant and 
sizeable positive relationship with employment change in Models 1-6.  All of the other 
governance and ownership variables are insignificant in the full sample and reduced sample 
models.  It is interesting to note, however, that share options have the opposite effect to 
ownership, with the options coefficient just failing to become significant at p < 0.05.  This is as 
predicted, and consistent with earlier work on managerial ownership and labour policies 
(Cronqvist et al. 2009).  Further, options have no downside risk so can encourage riskier 
managerial behaviour (Sanders 2001).  When both share ownership and share option variables 
are inserted separately (not shown in Table 4), the effects of each are broadly unchanged, 
indicating that the two function independently of each other.   This is confirmed by the very low 
correlation between the two variables (see the correlation matrix in Appendix 2).        
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Although the employment change variable is constructed to be symmetrical between 
positive and negative values, it is possible that the determinants of employment change are 
asymmetric between growth and decline.  To investigate this, Models 7 and 8 report results when 
the sample is split into two sub-samples: workforce reduction (WFR) and workforce growth 
(WFG).  In Model 7 (WFR) the employment effect is always negative: to facilitate interpretation 
the signs on the reported coefficients are reversed.  Thus a positive coefficient means a positive 
relationship with employment reductions.  There are no significant variables in Model 7.  In 
Model 8 (the workforce growth sub-sample) positive signs indicate positive relationships with 
employment growth.  Here the results indicate that takeovers of firms with higher profitability 
tend to be associated with subsequent employment growth.  Executive ownership has a 
substantial positive relationship with employment growth (at p < 0.01).   
In Models 9 and 10 the sample is reduced by removing cases where employment change 
is affected by divestments.  The results are qualitatively the same as in Models 7 and 8.  In 
Model 9 the ownership and governance variables remain insignificant whilst in in Model 10 
executive ownership continues to have a sizeable, positive significant relationship with 
employment growth.  The pre-takeover profitability performance of both target and acquirer 
continue to be associated with employment growth. 
TABLE FIVE ABOUT HERE 
Table 5 examines determinants of employment change between the takeover and the third 
year post-takeover.  There is considerable continuity with the results for the first year after the 
takeover.  In most specifications for the full models Executive share ownership continues to have 
significant positive (at p< 0.05 or better) effects on employment change, though the coefficients 
are smaller than in Table 5.  Other ownership and governance variables, including share options, 
have insignificant effects.  The profitability of the target prior to takeover continues to impact on 
employment change, as do its wage levels in a negative direction.  In the Year 3 models, 
however, the negative effects of leverage become stronger in both the full sample and when 
companies with divestments are excluded.        
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To summarise so far, Executive share ownership has a strong positive relationship with 
employment change, and the effect seems to be concentrated in cases of employment growth.  
None of the other ownership and governance variables are significant, except the Proportion of 
non-executive directors in Table 4, Model 8.   The fact that these variables are mainly 
insignificant suggests that entrenchment of executives is not a reason for the association between 
executive share ownership and employment growth.  They may, of course, be pursuing their own 
interests but there is no evidence that this puts them at odds with major shareholders.    
The positive effects of executive share ownership on employment change may conceal 
more complex relationships given that the governance literature has suggested that ownership 
may have both alignment and entrenchment (i.e. opposing) effects.  This literature has found that 
the relationship between managerial ownership and performance is non-linear (Bos et al. 2012; 
Cosh et al. 2006; Morck et al. 1988; Short and Keasey, 1999).  The argument goes that low 
levels of ownership are associated with improvements in performance, and this reflects an 
alignment effect of incentives.  However, the effects of incentives diminish, and the potential for 
securing effective control increases, as the size of managerial ownership increases.   Thus, 
beyond a certain point managerial owners are said to become entrenched.  In principle, similar 
processes might be observed in relation to employment change.  At low levels of ownership 
managers may be incentivised to reduce employment but at higher levels insider control may 
encourage them to expand employment.   
TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE 
To investigate this, several non-linear models are run and these are summarised in Table 
6.  A quadratic term for executive ownership is added to the baseline models reported in Tables 4 
and 5.  First differencing the combination of a negative sign on the original variable, a positive 
and significant sign on the squared variable indicates that the regression line is slightly convex 
for the full sample for employment change in the first year.  When divestment cases are 
excluded, the coefficient on the original variable becomes positive but neither this nor the 
squared variable significant.  When the exercise is repeated for three years post-takeover none of 
the coefficients are significant.  In all cases the change in model fit between linear and 
polynomial models is small or non-existent, and overall the results suggest that the relationship 
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between executive ownership and employment change is not markedly non-linear.  Figure 1 
displays the post-estimation polynomial regression line for the Year 1 model where all other 
variables are held at their mean.  It shows that at low levels of executive ownership average 
employment change is slightly negative, with the inflection point at 7.3 per cent, before 
becoming strongly positive.  Figure 2 shows the same model where cases of divestment are 
excluded.  Visual comparison of Figures 1 and 2 highlights that employment reductions are 
concentrated in companies where divestments occur.  Although there is some convexity to the 
relationship, overall there is little evidence to support a non-linear relationship of alignment and 
entrenchment as far as executive ownership and employment change are concerned.           
FIGURES 1 AND 2 ABOUT HERE.  
    
Further analysis 
i) Moderation by contextual factors 
The results indicate that executive share ownership has a positive relationship with employment 
change.  It is possible that the effects of ownership are concentrated in certain situations, and that 
the direction of their effects is contingent on context.  For instance, executive ownership might 
be expected to have negative effects on employment when takeovers are instigated to bring about 
horizontal restructuring and efficiencies, but positive otherwise.  To investigate this, the share 
ownership and share option variables are interacted with a range of other variables used in this 
analysis.   The interaction models relate to employment change one year after the takeover and 
are based on Models 1 and 4 in Table 4 (depending on whether the Relatedness or takeover 
objectives results are reported).  Executive share ownership, and then Executive share options, 
are interacted with leverage, cash, relatedness, the various takeover objectives, premium, relative 
employment size, and target ROA.  The results are summarised in Table 7. 
 
TABLE 7a AND b ABOUT HERE   
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In nearly all instances the interactions with executive share ownership and options are 
insignificant, whilst the coefficients on ownership mainly retain levels of magnitude and 
significance found in models without these interaction terms.  As for options (Table 7b), the 
options coefficient becomes significant in several instances indicating that options become more 
powerful in certain situations where the conditioning variable takes a low value.  For both 
executive ownership and options, model fit remains more or less unchanged with the addition of 
interaction terms.      
There are four exceptions to the pattern of insignificant interaction terms.  One, the interaction of 
Premium and Executive share ownership is positive and significant.  This is perhaps surprising 
because other studies have found that high premiums are associated with reductions in 
employment.  The explanation has been that reductions in wage costs are necessary to recoup 
takeover costs (Krishnan et al. 2007).  Ownership might incentivise managers to reduce 
employment in these situations.  Instead the opposite is the case.  A possible explanation is that 
executives with ownership pay high premia where they are confident of the growth prospects for 
the firm, and that, contrary to earlier findings about the dangers of over-confidence (Malmendier 
and Tate 2005; 2008), this confidence appears to be justified by subsequent employment growth.   
Two, there are positive interaction effects on employment where executives with a high level of 
ownership take-over companies that are relatively large.  Otherwise, taking over relatively large 
companies has significant negative effects on employment change.  Once again, a selection 
explanation seems most credible.  Given that acquiring larger firms can create more pronounced 
integration problems, as reported by Smeets et al. (2012), incentivized managers may only take-
over relatively large firms when the risks are perceived to be small and they are confident of 
growth prospects.  Three, where high levels of executive ownership are present in takeovers 
aimed at diversification positive employment change is observed, suggesting that incentivized 
executives mount takeovers involving diversification to create growth.  Confidence that 
integration will not be a problem may also be a factor.   Four, where executives with options 
take-over firms with high profitability (Target ROA), and take-over firms to diversify, 
employment growth is observed.  Once again, this is consistent with selection explanations.  
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ii) Selection effects 
Since the findings so far indicate that selection effects could explain the positive 
relationship between executive ownership and employment growth, selection effects are 
considered further.  Executive ownership could incentivize top managers to take-over firms with 
better performance or growth prospects because their wealth is at risk.  Alternatively, executive 
options might encourage managers to mount more risky takeovers because option holders are 
protected from downside risk (Tufano 1996; Sanders and Hambrick 2007).  To consider these 
possibilities we test for the effect of ownership and governance variables on the type of 
takeovers undertaken and various aspects of the target company performance
xiii
.    Table 8 
reports results. 
 
TABLE 8 ABOUT HERE 
We first mount a series of probits where takeover motives are the dependent variable.  
The results presented provide strong evidence for a selection explanation of the relationship 
between ownership and employment change post-takeover.  Executives with share ownership 
have a significant probability of mounting takeovers for growth objectives but have a significant 
lower probability of mounting takeovers aimed at rationalisation (Horizontal efficiency).  The 
clear implication is that executives with ownership mount takeovers that are more likely to lead 
to employment growth.  None of the other ownership and governance variables are significant, 
with the exception of Non-executive share ownership (the positive effect suggests that the 
positive effects on Executive share ownership reflect alignment rather than entrenchment 
effects).  It is notable that Executive options are associated with neither growth nor 
rationalisation takeovers.  The results of probits where diversification and vertical integration are 
takeover objectives are not reported as all ownership and governance variables are insignificant.  
These results are not surprising as there is no clear theoretical reason for expecting that 
incentivized executives will be more or less likely to mount takeovers with these objectives. 
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Next we consider whether executive ownership has any relationship with the 
performance of target companies.  The rationale is that executive shareholders will take-over 
better performing companies because of the possible effects of the takeover on their wealth.  The 
results show no relationship between Executive share ownership and Target ROA but there is a 
significant positive relationship with labour productivity of the target company.  Executives with 
ownership take-over more productive companies, and this may partly explain why executive 
ownership is associated with employment growth after takeovers.  It is interesting to note that 
Executive options also has a significant positive relationship with Target labour productivity.   
None of the other ownership and governance variables are significant, with the exception of 
External large combined ownership on Target ROA: it is difficult to explain this result as it 
seems counter-intuitive.   
Overall, these findings suggest that the relationship between executive ownership and 
employment change observed in the paper can at least in part be attributed to selection effects.  
Executives with ownership mount takeovers aimed at growth rather than restructuring, and to do 
this they select more productive firms as targets.  Although this evidence cannot conclusively 
lead us to reject an entrenchment perspective on the reasons for employment growth where 
executives have ownership, it does provide further evidence to indicate that entrenchment is not 
the most important reason for the observed employment changes after takeovers.   
           
5. Conclusions 
This paper has examined the determinants of employment change in the immediate 
aftermath of M&A using a sample of 235 UK mergers.  Contrary to widely-held views, these 
transactions do not always lead to employment reductions.  In fact, in 46 per cent of cases, 
employment grew in the first year post-transaction compared with the combined employment of 
target and acquirer at the time when the transaction occurred.   Where employment was reduced, 
the median change was 16 per cent.  Where it increased the change was around 14 per cent.  The 
median change in employment by the end of the first year was -2.6 per cent, growing to -9.2 per 
cent after three years.  When we exclude cases where divestments occurred shortly after the 
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takeover, most cases display employment growth after the takeover (cf. Denis 1994).   By the 
end of the first year median employment change was 2.3 per cent, rising to 5 per cent by the end 
of the third year. This indicates that much of the net employment reduction observed in our 
sample is due to transfer of jobs to other firms rather than to absolute job loss.    These findings 
cast doubt on claims that takeovers are nearly always bad for labour, though the welfare effects 
of job transfer are not under-estimated (and we do not know what happens to employees 
subsequent to job transfers).  However, it should be borne in mind that our sample selection 
criteria, adopted for methodological reasons, excludes some takeovers which may be more likely 
to reduce jobs (eg. those made by foreign firms).  Serial acquirers are also excluded.  For this 
reason we do not claim that our sample is fully representative of all takeovers of listed 
companies in the UK. 
The main contribution of the paper is that it investigates the role of ownership and 
governance in post-takeover employment change.  Although this issue has been repeatedly raised 
in the recent governance and labour literature, there has been little empirical investigation.  Our 
findings are novel: executive ownership is positively associated with employment growth, and 
negatively predicts the probability of lay-offs post-transaction.  This result is consistently found 
in very nearly all specifications, with a range of controls for company and takeover 
characteristics.  These results are most clearly seen at the end of the first year of takeover but the 
effects persist through to the end of the third year.  We also tested for the effect of other features 
of ownership and governance but for the most part these do not appear to have significant effects 
on employment change.  In particular, executive options do not affect lay-offs or employment 
change.  This is perhaps not surprising: predictions about the effects of options highlight their 
contribution to decisions with high variance but within a sample of takeovers these decisions 
may cancel each other out.  Large shareholders, considered as either the single large bloc holder 
or the group of all large shareholders, do not appear to have an important bearing on employment 
change.  Non-executive share ownership has insignificant effects throughout but the proportion 
of non-executive directors has a negative effect on lay-offs, a result that mirrors research on non-
executives more generally (Mura 2007).  
Previous work in the executive ownership and performance literature has drawn attention 
to the opposing effects of ownership on alignment and entrenchment (Bos et al. 2012; Morck et 
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al. 1988; Cosh et al. 2006), and we have considered whether a similar phenomenon might be 
observed in the case of employment change.  In particular, an issue is whether rising ownership 
by executives insulates them from shareholder discipline, thereby enabling them to ‘go soft’ on 
labour and to embark on ‘empire building’.  We find little evidence to support the entrenchment 
perspective, though it is possible that managers also enjoy private benefits from employment 
growth.  The coefficients on the measures of other shareholders are always insignificant, often 
tiny, and generally take the same sign as the executive ownership coefficients.  Where 
governance variables are significant, as in the case of the proportion of non-executive directors 
(in relation to lay-offs), they take the same sign as executive ownership.   We examined the 
linearity of executive ownership at the end of years one and three, and found no evidence of the 
U-shaped curves observed in the performance literature.  Finally, we note that the profitability 
performance of the post-transaction company has significant positive effects on employment 
change, suggesting that executive ownership does not function to encourage employment growth 
at the expense of profitability (though a partial substitution effect cannot be ruled out).   
In place of an entrenchment effect our findings support a selection perspective.  
Executives with ownership appear to be incentivized to mount takeovers of better performing 
companies and with growth rather than rationalisation objectives.  These effects then feed 
through post-takeover to support employment growth.  Evidence for this perspective comes from 
analysis of moderation effects, where significant interaction terms are most readily interpreted in 
this way, and from consideration of the role of executive ownership in influencing takeover types 
and target companies.  A further novelty in the paper is that we integrate qualitative data on the 
purposes of particular takeovers into our analysis.  This enables us to differentiate between 
takeovers aimed at market growth and those at restructuring, as well as supply chain integration 
and diversification.  It is clear from our findings that there is a group of takeovers where 
rationalisation and restructuring are very important features.  Lay-offs, divestments, and 
employment reductions all take place after the transaction.  But, these are not transactions 
mounted by managers with substantial ownership stakes.  These findings are consistent with a 
prospect theory perspective (Kahneman and Tversky 1984): executives with wealth at risk will 
not want to take actions which could have adverse effects on their wealth, whereas managers 
without equity wealth in the company may take more risky actions.  They have less to lose.       
  
30 
 
The significance for policy and practice of our results is that as ownership by executives 
is increasingly promoted in the UK, in place of other instruments such as stock options, the 
effects of takeovers may come to have more benign effects on labour in the longer term.  In the 
context of the current policy debate in the UK about takeover regulation, our evidence might 
suggest that further regulation may not be necessary to protect labour’s interests, at least as far as 
takeovers by UK listed firms are concerned.   However, it should be borne in mind that the 
period of the study was a takeover wave where many takeovers were aimed at taking advantage 
of growth opportunities rather than rationalisation of contracting industries and excess capacity.  
A further consideration is the growth in cross-border M & A activity: host country employees 
may suffer more than country of origin employees after takeovers (Girma and Gorg 2003).  
Thus, there may be a case for further regulation of takeovers by foreign firms, at least from a 
labour perspective.      
Although we have been able to merge together data from company accounts, shareholder 
registers, and qualitative sources, there are nevertheless some limitations with our data.  Most 
important, we have to focus on net employment change rather than the parallel processes of job 
creation and destruction.  Our data is derived from company level and we do not have access to 
plant-level data on employment unlike a recent large-scale US study on private equity and 
employment (Davis et al. 2011).  Nor are we able to quantify the employment transfer and job 
loss effects of divestments as this information is not reported by companies (cf. Denis 1994), 
though we can exclude cases where divestments to take place.  When these companies are 
excluded, the average employment effect of takeovers is positive.  Interpretation of our results 
should also take into account that the 1990s was characterised by takeovers aimed at enhancing 
growth rather than rationalising industries in response to excess capacity, as occurred in the 
1980s (Martynova and Reeneboog 2005).               
Although our interpretations are limited by our data sources, the important role of 
managerial ownership emphasizes that there are three main actors in takeovers and their 
aftermath: management, labour, and shareholders.  Much of the takeover literature tends to focus 
on ‘dyads’ of managers and shareholders, or shareholders and employees.  In particular, the 
labour-focused literature on wages and employment changes tends to refer primarily to 
shareholders, largely in terms of whether there is a value transfer between the two groups 
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(Shleifer and Summers 1988; Beckman and Forbes 2004).  But it is clear from our findings that 
management is important too, and that characteristics of executives have an important impact on 
outcomes.  Ideally future research will be able to expand the range of managerial characteristics 
under consideration.   
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Table 1. Takeovers of UK public companies during 1990 – 2000   
   
Source: Acquisitions Monthly, 1990 – 2000.  
Notes: The transaction values are expressed in real terms (2003 pounds sterling).  
Number
Transaction 
value (£m)
Number
Transaction 
value (£m)
Number
Transaction 
value (£m)
Number
Transaction 
value (£m)
1990 125 14,636        53 8,306          72 6,330          17 2,389          
1991 89 8,018          29 1,802          60 6,216          22 4,884          
1992 60 12,946        17 5,031          43 7,915          14 2,122          
1993 58 3,711          16 1,017          42 2,694          16 1,482          
1994 64 5,158          24 1,766          40 3,392          12 1,368          
1995 87 41,996        29 12,041        58 29,955        26 18,216        
1996 87 25,422        28 8,484          59 16,938        15 1,856          
1997 123 34,502        54 15,593        69 18,909        23 5,445          
1998 162 44,065        58 21,890        104 22,175        29 8,882          
1999 197 74,317        41 46,595        156 27,722        34 11,510        
2000 113 85,724        39 30,703        74 55,021        27 12,768        
Total 1165 350,495      388 153,228      777 197,267      235 70,922        
Sampled takeovers of 
UK public companies
Year
Takeovers of UK 
public companies
Takeovers by UK 
public companies
Takeovers by foreign 
companies
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Table 2 Descriptive statistics 
Notes: The table reports deal-weighted average employment change, where all M&A transactions are weighted equally. a - 
number of the target matched firms is 235 and acquirer matched firms is 235. b - percentage of laid off employees only for those 
acquirers that make employee layoffs, i.e. only for the sub-sample of 101 acquirers. c - number of observations in Year 3 declines 
to 208 due to missing data for 27 acquirers. Consequently, employment change by the end of Year 3 represents workforce change 
only for continuing observations.
Mean Med SD Mean Med SD Mean Med SD
Panel A: Pre-takeover labour data
Target employment (number of employees) 3313 770 9067 4485 1096 11068 1586 623 4295
Acquirer employment (number of employees) 13088 2975 27036 16427 3285 32413 8167 2903 15000
Target matched firm employment
a
2088 706 4729
Acquirer matched firm employment 9214 2661 16740
Target average wage (£000) 23.33 21.58 12.08 22.39 21.23 9.80 24.71 21.81 14.76
Acquirer average wage (£000) 23.04 22.11 9.77 22.77 21.68 10.53 23.44 22.96 8.57
Number of observations 235 127 108
Panel B: Post-takeover layoffs and employment change
Acquirers that announce employee lay-offs (number) 101 89 12
Percentage of laid off employees post-merger
b
 (%) -7.82 -6.06 6.96 -5.40 -2.84 6.38 -0.75 0.00 2.79
Employment change by the end of Year 1 (%) -2.60 -2.08 32.69 -23.85 -15.50 24.76 22.39 14.84 21.19
Employment change by the end of Year 3
c
 (%) -9.20 -8.17 51.23 -34.52 -26.46 42.31 20.90 21.38 44.27
Matched firm employment change by the end of Year 1 (%) -1.25 1.40 26.20 -5.75 -2.22 28.98 4.04 5.52 21.45
Matched firm employment change by the end of Year 3 (%) -3.29 1.58 40.39 -9.33 -3.39 41.56 3.83 5.71 37.93
Panel C: Divestments and employment change
Divestments by the end of Year 1 (number) 54 46 8
Divestments by the end of Year 3 (number) 66 55 11
Empl. change for non-divestment subsample by the end of Yr 1 (%)3.99 2.29 29.31 -19.44 -12.24 18.53 22.99 15.06 21.69
Empl. change for non-divestment subsample by the end of Yr 3 (%)2.24 5.42 46.04 -37.11 -24.85 37.24 32.59 24.52 23.83
Panel D: Ownership and governance
Executive share ownership (%) 5.18 0.82 10.25 3.13 0.47 5.62 7.59 1.48 13.49
Executive share options (%) 0.72 0.32 1.46 0.88 0.41 1.89 0.53 0.37 0.63
Non-executive share ownership (%) 1.32 0.09 3.83 1.09 0.07 2.74 1.61 0.11 4.80
External largest single ownership (%) 10.53 8.85 8.99 9.77 8.81 8.63 11.43 10.30 9.06
External large combined ownership (%) 25.50 23.17 19.34 25.48 23.09 20.27 25.36 23.03 18.26
Proportion of non-exec. directors (ratio) 0.44 0.44 0.14 0.44 0.43 0.14 0.44 0.44 0.14
Panel E: Synergy
Related acquisitions (number) 141 71 70
Diversification (number) 26 18 8
Horizontal growth (number) 109 43 66
Horizontal efficiency (number) 63 46 17
Vertical integration (number) 37 20 17
Relative employment size (ratio) 0.81 0.35 1.78 1.05 0.44 2.27 0.52 0.21 0.83
Panel F: Transaction related data
Hostile acquisitions (number) 52 34 18
Cash-paid acquisitions (number) 68 43 25
Leverage (ratio) 0.45 0.46 0.18 0.48 0.50 0.19 0.42 0.42 0.17
Premium (%) 38.57 37.00 34.53 35.77 35.00 34.05 41.50 38.00 35.07
Capital intensity (£000 per employee) 82 23 393 86 27 487 78 25 242
Panel G: Pre-takeover performance data
Target ROA (unadjusted, %) 0.17 0.15 0.13 0.16 0.15 0.09 0.19 0.15 0.19
Acquirer ROA (unadjusted, %) 0.20 0.18 0.22 0.20 0.18 0.27 0.21 0.19 0.15
Target labour productivity (unadjusted, £000) 149 98 175 135 90 125 168 104 255
Acquirer labour productivity (unadjusted, £000) 130 96 115 126 94 125 138 103 104
Full sample WFR sub-sample WFG sub-sample
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Table 3 Determinants of merger-related employee layoffs 
Notes: The estimation method is probit regression.  Significance levels: *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001. 
Dependent variable:
Independent variables Coefficients
Marginal 
effects Coefficients
Marginal 
effects Coefficients
Marginal 
effects Coefficients
Marginal 
effects Coefficients
Marginal 
effects Coefficients
Marginal 
effects
Executive share ownership - 0.074*** - 0.021*** - 0.074*** - 0.021*** - 0.075*** - 0.021*** - 0.064*** - 0.018*** - 0.090*** - 0.024***
Executive share options - 0.064 - 0.018 - 0.042 - 0.013 - 0.057 - 0.016 - 0.057 - 0.016 0.016 0.004
Non-executive share ownership 0.011 0.003 0.007 0.002 - 0.002 - 0.001 0.013 0.004 0.017 0.005 0.014 0.004
External largest single ownership - -0.010 - 0.003 - 0.011 - 0.003 - 0.007 - 0.002                               
External large combined ownership - 0.010 - 0.003 - 0.009 - 0.003 - 0.009 - 0.002
Proportion of non-exec. directors - 1.877* - 0.534* - 1.663* - 0.475* - 0.934 - 0.295 - 1.787* - 0.505* - 1.910* - 0.537* - 1.395 - 0.365
Related acquisitions - 0.045 - 0.013 - 0.043 - 0.012 - 0.065 - 0.020 - 0.033 - 0.009
Horizontal growth - 0.241 - 0.069 - 0.237 - 0.064
Horizontal efficiency 1.099*** 0.289*** 1.081** 0.307** 
Vertical integration 0.37 0.106 0.403 0.116
Relative employment size 0.292*** 0.083*** 0.280** 0.080** 0.230** 0.073** 0.320*** 0.090*** 0.380*** 0.107*** 0.386*** 0.101***
Hostile acquisitions 0.323 0.094 0.305 0.089 0.275 0.089 0.284 0.082 0.155 0.043 - 0.073 - 0.019
Premium - 0.190 - 0.054 - 0.176 - 0.050 - 0.111 - 0.035 - 0.192 - 0.054 - 0.006 - 0.002 0.140 0.037
Cash paid acquisitions 0.463 0.135 0.468 0.136 0.495* 0.160* 0.463 0.133 0.46 0.123 0.537 0.124
Leverage 1.387* 0.395* 1.380* 0.394* 1.684** 0.533** 1.437* 0.407* 1.854** 0.521** 1.652* 0.432*
Capital intensity - 0.137 - 0.039 - 0.137 - 0.039 - 0.099 - 0.031 - 0.151 - 0.043 - 0.151 - 0.042 - 0.153 - 0.040
Divestment 0.894*** 0.247*** 0.893*** 0.248*** 0.988*** 0.297*** 0.852*** 0.236*** 0.607* 0.182*
Target pre-takeover ROA - 1.278 - 0.364 - 1.308 - 0.373 - 1.146 - 0.363 - 1.425* - 0.403* - 1.224 - 0.344 - 1.450*  - 0.380*  
Acquirer pre-takeover ROA - 1.365 - 0.388 - 1.261 - 0.360 - 0.625 - 0.198 - 1.305 - 0.369 - 1.838* - 0.516* - 1.317 - 0.344
Target pre-takeover labour productivity 0.263 0.075 0.246 0.070 0.195 0.062 0.273 0.077 0.145 0.041 - 0.053 - 0.014
Acquirer pre-takeover labour productivity - 0.107 - 0.031 - 0.074 - 0.021 - 0.149 - 0.047 - 0.117 - 0.033 0.112 0.032 0.202 0.053
Target pre-takeover average wage 0.442 0.126 0.445 0.127 0.387 0.122 0.452 0.128 0.451 0.127 0.645 0.169
Acquirer pre-takeover average wage 0.015 0.004 - 0.012 - 0.004 0.129 0.041 - 0.029 - -0.008 - 0.282 - 0.079 - 0.247 - 0.065
Constant 0.986* * 0.839 - 0.145 1.163** ** 0.772 0.641                
Log-likelihood - 118.306 - 118.73 - 130.153 - 116.983 - 103.675 - 80.686
Restricted log-likelihood - 160.565 - 160.565 - 160.565 - 160.565 - 160.565 - 114.977
Chi-squared 73.594*** 74.178*** 66.359*** 74.260*** 102.407*** 64.551***
Pseudo-R-squared 0.263 0.261 0.189 0.271 0.354 0.298
Number of observations 235 235 235 235 235 181
Model 6
Employee lay-offs
Model 5Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
  
35 
 
Table 4  The effects of ownership and governance on employment change in Year 1 
Notes: The estimation method is OLS, using heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors. Significance levels: *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001. 
Dependent variable:
WFR WFG WFR WFG
Independent variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10
Executive share ownership 0.200** 0.262*** 0.182** 0.161* 0.223** 0.241*** 0.184 0.337** 0.149 0.330** 
Executive share options - 0.135 - 0.096 - 0.121 - 0.133 - 0.091 - 0.128 0.163 0.169 - 0.038 0.158
Non-executive share ownership 0.040 0.009 0.052 0.038 0.004 0.086 0.026 - 0.037 0.125 - 0.033
External largest single ownership 0.077 0.078                - 0.053 - 0.020 0.060 - 0.004
External large combined ownership - 0.040 - 0.041 - 0.036 - 0.021                
Proportion of non-exec. directors - 0.040 - 0.010 - 0.030 - 0.015 0.035 - 0.046 0.139 0.219* 0.083 0.193
Related acquisitions 0.002 0.067 - 0.017 - 0.023 0.016 - 0.159 0.130 - 0.150
Horizontal growth 0.168 0.229                
Horizontal efficiency 0.003 0.015                
Vertical integration 0.122 0.159                
Relative employment size - 0.185* - 0.190* - 0.164 - 0.142 - 0.159 - 0.257** 0.061 0.056 0.211 0.048
Hostile acquisitions - 0.066 - 0.047 - 0.067 - 0.058 - 0.051 - 0.117*  0.115 0.007 0.106 - 0.025
Premium 0.045 0.041 0.043 0.037 0.028 0.023 - 0.052 - 0.100 - 0.039 - 0.086
Cash paid acquisitions - 0.104 - 0.127 - 0.111 - 0.081 - 0.107 - 0.176*  0.005 - 0.018 0.174 - 0.014
Leverage - 0.106 - 0.266** - 0.109 - 0.092 - 0.236** - 0.048 - 0.030 - 0.072 0.257 - 0.076
Capital intensity 0.052 0.174* 0.061 0.049 0.159 0.020 0.190 0.027 0.018 0.041
Change in control firm employment 0.133 0.088 0.130 0.139 0.131 0.192*  0.037 0.035 0.209 - 0.012
Divestment - 0.221*** - 0.239*** - 0.208**                0.181 - 0.088                
Target pre-takeover ROA 0.184*** 0.267*** 0.168*** 0.163*** 0.239***                - 0.096 0.211* - 0.031 0.208*  
Acquirer pre-takeover ROA 0.142* 0.133 0.136 0.141* 0.115                - 0.057 0.289* - 0.130 0.325** 
Acquirer post-takeover ROA 0.263***
Target pre-takeover labour productivity 0.119 0.135 0.118 0.122 0.106 0.071 - 0.189 0.133 - 0.157 0.131
Acquirer pre-takeover labour productivity - 0.106 - 0.196 - 0.103 - 0.133 - 0.218 - 0.051 - 0.082 - 0.186 0.054 - 0.173
Target pre-takeover average wage - 0.248** - 0.288** - 0.238** - 0.213* - 0.238* - 0.208*  0.195 - 0.263 0.166 - 0.253
Acquirer pre-takeover average wage 0.138 0.138 0.121 0.132 0.133 0.110 0.048 0.124 0.070 0.122
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
F-statistic 4.15*** 3.38*** 4.36*** 4.56*** 3.71*** 3.82*** 2.27** 2.56*** 4.53*** 2.67***
Adjusted R squared 0.28 0.21 0.28 0.293 0.226 0.23 0.09 0.31 0.21 0.31
Number of observations 235 181 235 235 181 235 127 108 81 100
Employment change in Year 1
Full sample
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Table 5 The effects of ownership and governance on employment change by the end of Year 3 
 
Notes: The estimation method is OLS, using heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors. Significance levels: *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001. 
Dependent variable:
WFR WFG WFR WFG
Independent variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10
Executive share ownership 0.121* 0.202** 0.125* 0.094 0.176** 0.173** 0.128 0.145 - 0.153 0.134
Executive share options - 0.038 - 0.064 - 0.031 - 0.037 - 0.072 - 0.073 0.019 0.050 0.006 0.019
Non-executive share ownership 0.030 - 0.039 0.021 0.004 - 0.094 0.031 - 0.114 0.161 0.036 0.077
External largest single ownership 0.101 0.116                - 0.085 0.037 0.010 - 0.015
External large combined ownership 0.062 0.056 0.041 0.040
Proportion of non-exec. directors - 0.079 0.003 - 0.068 - 0.068 0.053 - 0.075 0.061 0.019 - 0.147 - 0.008
Related acquisitions 0.019 0.047 0.005 0.034 0.131 - 0.092 0.188 - 0.071
Horizontal growth 0.199 0.232                
Horizontal efficiency 0.029 - 0.062                
Vertical integration 0.032 0.114                
Relative employment size - 0.102 - 0.089 - 0.106 - 0.099 - 0.093 - 0.246*  - 0.070 - 0.060 - 0.104 - 0.057
Hostile acquisitions 0.017 0.009 0.015 0.027 0.008 - 0.057 0.086 - 0.051 0.212 - 0.124
Premium 0.060 0.114 0.058 0.034 0.070 0.011 - 0.245** - 0.035 - 0.195 0.008
Cash paid acquisitions - 0.042 - 0.024 - 0.047 - 0.029 - 0.001 - 0.196*  0.018 - 0.164 - 0.129 - 0.186
Leverage - 0.212** - 0.348*** - 0.217** - 0.222** - 0.305*** - 0.252** 0.139 - 0.243 0.359* - 0.230
Capital intensity 0.135 0.259* 0.150 0.138 0.248** 0.127 - 0.003 0.272* - 0.160 0.303
Change in control firm employment 0.072 0.213* 0.061 0.060 0.222* 0.060 0.090 - 0.014 0.034 - 0.010
Divestment - 0.265*** - 0.265*** - 0.224**                0.150 - 0.043                  
Target pre-takeover ROA 0.132** 0.217** 0.127* 0.123* 0.175*                0.011 0.207* - 0.133 0.236*  
Acquirer pre-takeover ROA 0.128 0.060 0.122 0.121 0.048                - 0.115 0.203 0.051 0.157
Acquirer post-takeover ROA 0.141*  
Target pre-takeover labour productivity 0.147 0.125 0.153 0.149 0.088 0.086 - 0.317 0.046 - 0.303 0.049
Acquirer pre-takeover labour productivity - 0.106 - 0.219 - 0.108 - 0.119 - 0.268* - 0.099 0.114 - 0.192 0.429 - 0.243
Target pre-takeover average wage - 0.223* - 0.239* - 0.224* - 0.200* - 0.182 - 0.205 0.310* - 0.161 0.449 - 0.162
Acquirer pre-takeover average wage 0.123 0.151 0.121 0.122 0.200 0.173 - 0.055 0.203 - 0.273 0.205
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
F-statistic 4.05*** 3.97*** 4.03*** 4.22*** 3.41*** 2.56*** 1.30 7.03*** 1.25 5.82***
Adjusted R squared 0.15 0.14 0.14 0.16 0.18 0.10 0.04 0.18 0.10 0.14
Number of observations 208 147 208 208 147 206 113 95 64 83
Employment change by the end of Year 3
Full sample
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Table 6 Non-linear effects of executive share ownership on employment 
 
 Notes: The estimation method is OLS, using heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors. Significance levels: *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dependent variables:
Independent variables: 
Executive ownership 0.200** - 0.310 0.262** 0.018 0.121* 0.065 0.202** 0.184
Squared executive ownership 0.264* 0.279 0.090 0.020
All other control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
F-statistic 4.15*** 5.56*** 3.38*** 4.23*** 4.05*** 6.26*** 3.97*** 4.24***
Adjusted R squared 0.28 0.28 0.21 0.22 0.15 0.13 0.14 0.14
Number of observations 235 235 181 181 208 208 147 147
Employment change in Year 1 Employment change by the end of Year 3
Full sample Excluding divestment Full sample Excluding divestment
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Table 7a   Employment change in Year 1: moderating effects on executive share ownership  
 Notes: The estimation method is OLS, using heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors. Significance levels: * p<0.05; ** p<0.01, ***p<0.001. 
 Baseline models: Table 4 - Model 1 and Model 4 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dependent variable: 
Conditioning variables: Leverage Cash Related Premium
Relative 
emp. size
Target 
ROA Growth Efficiency Vertical
Diversifi-
cation
Executive ownership in baseline model 0.200** 0.200** 0.200* 0.200** 0.200** 0.200** 0.161** 0.161** 0.161** 0.161**
Conditioning variable in baseline model - 0.106 - 0.104 0.002 0.045 - 0.185* 0.184*** 0.168 0.003 0.122 - 0.105
Executive ownership in conditioned model 0.158* 0.193* 0.271** 0.144 0.156** 0.197*** 0.260** 0.197** 0.183** 0.179**
Conditioning variable - 0.099 - 0.103 - 0.009 0.045 - 0.167 0.186*** 0.143* - 0.226** 0.069 - 0.079
Interaction term - 0.094 0.016 0.088 0.161** 0.106* 0.059 - 0.095 - 0.164 0.047 0.059*
All other control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
F-statistic 4.28***  4.02***  4.26*** 4.97*** 4.11*** 4.09*** 4.54***    4.46*** 4.64*** 4.80***
Adjusted R squared 0.28 0.28 0.28 0.30 0.29 0.28 0.29 0.30 0.28 0.28
Number of observations 235 235 235 235 235 235 235 235 235 235
Employment change in Year 1
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Table 7b   Employment change in Year 1: moderating effects on executive share options  
 Notes: The estimation method is OLS, using heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors. Significance levels: * p<0.05; ** p<0.01, ***p<0.001. 
 Baseline models: Table 4 - Model 1 and Model 4 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dependent variable: 
Conditioning variables: Leverage Cash Related Premium
Relative 
emp. size
Target 
ROA Growth Efficiency Vertical
Diversifi-
cation
Executive options in baseline model - 0.135 - 0.135 - 0.135 - 0.135 - 0.135 - 0.135 0.133 0.133 0.133 0.133
Conditioning variable in baseline model - 0.106 - 0.104 0.002 0.045 - 0.185* 0.184*** 0.168 0.003 0.122 - 0.105
Executive options in conditioned model - 0.216* - 0.136 - 0.107 - 0.151* - 0.049 - 0.167* - 0.133 - 0.135* - 0.159 - 0.136
Conditioning variable - 0.124 - 0.107 0.008 0.042 - 0.200 0.201*** 0.147* - 0.128* 0.064 - 0.085
Interaction term 0.14 0.007 - 0.049 - 0.048 - 0.096 0.120* 0.090 - 0.042 0.027 0.009*
All other control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
F-statistic 4.81***                      4.00*** 4.04*** 4.00*** 4.50***  4.09*** 4.06***  4.40***  3.98***  3.93***
Adjusted R squared 0.29 0.28 0.28 0.28 0.28 0.29 0.29 0.29 0.28 0.28
Number of observations 235 235 235 235 235 235 235 235 235 235
Employment change in Year 1
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Table 8  The role of executive ownership in target selection 
Notes: The estimation methods are probit and OLS regressions, using heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors. Significance levels: * p<0.05; ** p<0.01, ***p<0.001.  
Dependent variables: 
Independent variables
Executive share ownership 0.026** 0.010** - 0.057*  - 0.017*  - 0.012 0.130*  
Executive share options - 0.010 - 0.004 - 0.068 - 0.020 0.011 0.114*  
Non-executive share ownership 0.051* 0.019* - 0.007 - 0.002 0.113 0.012
External large combined ownership 0.006 0.002 - 0.008 - 0.002 - 0.121* 0.059
Proportion of non-exec. directors 0.090 0.033 0.701 0.208 0.034 0.033
Relative employment size - 0.038 - 0.014 0.034 0.01 0.099 - 0.334***
Leverage 0.659 0.243 0.105 0.031 0.083 0.054
Capital intensity 0.017 0.006 0.011 0.003 - 0.088 0.036
Acquirer pre-takeover labour productivity 0.416** 0.154** - 0.448*  - 0.133*  0.431***
Target pre-takeover labour productivity - 0.182 - 0.067 0.289 0.086
Acquirer pre-takeover ROA 0.216                  
Horizontal growth                 - 0.005 0.065
Horizontal efficiency - 0.091 0.168
Vertical integration 0.018 0.120
Constant - 0.887 - 0.548
Log-likelihood - 151.32 - 123.51
Restricted log-likelihood - 162.27 - 136.62
Chi-squared 19.17* 22.78* F-statistic 1.15 5.79***
Pseudo-R-squared 0.07 0.10 Adjusted R-squared 0.04 0.23
Number of observations 235 235 235 235
Horizontal growth Horizontal efficiency   
Probit regressions OLS regressions
Coefficients
Marginal 
effects Coefficients
Marginal 
effects
Target 
Labour 
Productivity
Target 
ROA
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Figure 1  The relationship between executive ownership and employment change: full 
sample (non-linear) 
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Figure 2 The relationship between executive ownership and employment change: 
excluding divestment cases (non-linear) 
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Appendix 1 
Definitions of the variables 
Variable Definition Source Type 
Employee lay-offs  Employee layoffs variable takes 1 if the acquirer makes redundant at least 1 
per cent of the combined workforce of the acquired and the acquiring firms 
within a two year period after takeovers (as reported in the press), 0 
otherwise. 
Financial Times 
and other press 
reports, 
downloaded from 
Nexis® UK 
0,1 
Employment change in 
Year 1 (Year 3) 
Employment change in Year 1 (Year 3) variable indicates a percentage 
employment change, measured as the difference between the pre-takeover 
combined employment of the acquired and the acquiring firm and post-
takeover employment of the acquiring firm in Year 1 (Year 3), divided by 
the average of pre- and post-takeover employment. Pre-takeover pro-forma 
employment is constructed by combining the number of workers of the 
acquired and the acquiring firm in the year immediately before takeover 
completion year. Post-takeover employment indicates the number of 
workers of the acquiring firm in Year 1 (Year 3). The acquired and 
acquiring firm employment represents the annual average number of both 
full and part time workers, employed by the firms during the year, as 
reported in company annual reports.  
Datastream and 
Company Annual 
Reports 
% 
 
Executive share 
ownership 
Executive share ownership variable indicates the total number of shares 
owned by the acquirer’s executive directors, including CEO, and their 
immediate family members, divided by the acquirer’s total number of shares 
in issue at the end of accounting year immediately prior to takeover 
completion year.  
Hambro Company 
Guide, Price 
Waterhouse 
Corporate 
Register, Company 
Annual Reports 
% 
Executive share options Executive share options variable indicates the total number of shares 
awarded to the executive directors under executive share option schemes 
divided by the acquirer’s total number of shares in issue at the end of 
accounting year immediately prior to takeover completion year. 
As above % 
Non-executive 
ownership 
Non-executive ownership variable indicates the total number of shares 
owned by the acquirer’s non-executive directors and their immediate family 
members, divided by the acquirer’s total number of shares in issue at the end 
of accounting year immediately prior to takeover. 
As above % 
External largest single 
owner 
External largest single owner variable is measured as the percentage of 
ownership of the largest institutional or non-institutional non-board 
shareholder with ownership larger than 3 per cent of ordinary shares. 
As above % 
External large 
combined ownership  
External large combined ownership variable is measured as the percentage 
of ownership of all institutional and non-institutional non-board 
shareholdings with ownership larger than 3 per cent of the acquirer’s 
ordinary shares.  
As above % 
Proportion of non-
executive directors 
Proportion of non-executive directors variable is defined as the ratio of non-
executive directors to the total board size.  
As above % 
Related acquisitions Related acquisitions variable takes 1 if both acquired and acquiring firms 
are in the same industry, defined on the basis of Datastream Industrial 
Classification Benchmark Level Four, 0 otherwise.   
Datastream 0,1 
Diversification  Diversification variable takes 1 if a M&A deal is undertaken by a 
conglomerate acquirer, whose managers indicate business diversification as 
the main objective of the deal (as reported in the press), 0 otherwise.   
Financial Times 0,1 
Horizontal growth  Horizontal growth variable takes 1 if a M&A deal involves acquiring a rival 
firm and the acquiring firm managers indicate business growth and 
expansion as the main objective of the deal (as reported in the press), 0 
otherwise.   
Financial Times 0,1 
Horizontal efficiency  Horizontal efficiency variable takes 1 if the acquiring firm managers 
specifically indicate rationalisation, cost savings and other required 
improvements in the targeted firm as the main objective of the takeover 
transaction (as reported in the press), 0 otherwise.   
Financial Times 0,1 
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Vertical integration  Vertical integration variable takes 1 if a M&A deal involves two firms 
where there is some type of business relationship between them, such as 
supplier or customer (as reported in the press), 0 otherwise.   
Financial Times 0,1 
Relative employment 
size 
Relative employment size variable is the ratio of the acquired firm 
employment to the acquiring firm employment during the year immediately 
prior to acquisition completion year. This ratio is log transformed.  
Datastream Continous 
Hostile acquisitions  Hostile acquisitions takes variable 1 if an acquisition is defined as an hostile 
transaction by Acquisitions Monthly, 0 otherwise. 
Acquisitions 
Monthly, Financial 
Times 
0,1 
Premium Premium is the difference between the purchase price and the target firm 
share price 30 days before takeover announcement date, divided by the 
target firm share price 30 days before takeover announcement date.  
Acquisitions 
Monthly 
% 
Cash-paid acquisitions  Cash-paid acquisitions variable takes 1 if an acquisition was financed with 
100 per cent cash, 0 otherwise.  
Acquisitions 
Monthly 
0,1 
Leverage Leverage is the ratio of the acquirer’s total debt to its total assets at the end 
of the takeover completion year.  
Datastream % 
Capital intensity Capital intensity is the ratio of combined fixed asset values, expressed in 
real terms (2003 pounds sterling), of the acquired and acquiring firm at the 
end of the pre-takeover year to the combined workforce of the acquired and 
acquiring firm employed during that year. This ratio is log transformed.    
Datastream Continuous 
Divestments in Year 1 
(Year 3) 
Divestments in Year 1 (Year 3) variable takes 1 if the acquirer makes 
significant asset divestment by the end of Year 1 (Year 3), as reported in the 
press, 0 otherwise. 
Financial Times 0,1 
Control firm 
employment change in 
Year 1 (Year 3) 
Control firm employment change in Year 1 (Year3) is measured as the 
average change in employment of the two matched firms (matched acquired 
firms and matched acquirer) from pre-takeover period to the first (third) 
post-takeover year, divided by the average of their pre- and post-takeover 
employment.  
Computed based 
on Datastream 
data  
% 
Pre-takeover Target 
(Acquirer) ROA 
Pre-takeover Target (Acquirer) Return on Assets (ROA) is computed as 
Earnings Before Interest, Taxes and Depreciation (EBITDA) for a year 
divided by the book value of Total Assets at the beginning of the year. This 
performance measure is then adjusted by industry performance by 
subtracting from it the respective industry median ROA. Median measure of 
three pre-takeover years ROA is used.  
As above % 
 
Post-takeover Acquirer 
ROA in Year 1 (Year 3) 
Post-takeover Acquirer Return on Assets (ROA) in Year 1 (Year 3) is 
computed as Earnings Before Interest, Taxes and Depreciation (EBITDA) 
for the first (third) year after the takeover completion year divided by the 
book value of Total Assets at the beginning of that year. This performance 
measure is then adjusted by industry performance by subtracting from it the 
respective industry median ROA. 
As above % 
 
Pre-takeover Target 
(Acquirer) Labour 
Productivity 
 
Pre-takeover Target (Acquirer) Labour Productivity is measured as sales 
per employee, using data from the year immediately before the takeover 
completion year. This labour productivity measure is then normalised using 
the industry median labour productivity for the same period and log 
transformed.   
As above Continuous 
Pre-takeover Target 
(Acquirer) Average 
Wage 
Pre-takeover Target (Acquirer) Average Wage variable is the ratio of annual 
total staff costs in real terms (2003 pounds sterling) of the firm during the 
year immediately before takeover to the number of workers, employed by 
the firm during that year. This average wage measure is then scaled with the 
industry median wage for the same period and log transformed. 
As above Continuous 
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Appendix 2 
Correlation matrix 
Notes: * indicates significance at p<0.05 or better level. Appendix 1 provides the definitions of the variables.  
1. Employee layoffs; 2. Employment change in Year 1; 3. Employment change by the end of Year 3; 4. Executive share ownership; 5. Executive share options; 6. Non-executive ownership; 7. 
External largest single owner; 8. External large combined ownership; 9. Proportion of non-executive directors; 10. Related acquisitions; 11. Diversification; 12. Horizontal growth; 13. 
Horizontal efficiency; 14. Vertical integration; 15. Relative employment size; 16. Hostile acquisitions. 17. Premium; 18. Cash-paid acquisitions; 19. Leverage; 20. Capital intensity; 21. 
Divestments in Year 1; 22. Divestments in Year 3; 23. Control firm employment change in Year 1; 24.Control firm employment change in Year 3; 25. Pre-takeover Target ROA; 26. Pre-
takeover Acquirer ROA; 27. Post-takeover Acquirer ROA in Year 1; 28. Post-takeover Acquirer ROA in Year 3; 29. Pre-takeover Target Labour Productivity; 30. Pre-takeover Acquirer 
Labour Productivity; 31. Pre-takeover Target Average Wage; 32. Pre-takeover Acquirer Average Wage. 
 
 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32
1 1
2 -0.39* 1
3 -0.33* 0.72* 1
4 -0.25* 0.24* 0.17* 1
5 0.02 -0.16* -0.07 0.03 1
6 -0.04 0.02 0.00 0.08 0.23* 1
7 -0.02 0.00 0.05 -0.07 0.11 0.14* 1
8 -0.08 -0.07 0.02 -0.08 0.14* 0.13* 0.76*
9 -0.05 -0.04 -0.06 -0.19* -0.25* 0.10 0.16* 0.12 1
10 -0.06 0.02 0.06 0.00 -0.03 0.12 -0.12 -0.01 0.11 1
11 -0.34* 0.22* 0.28* 0.18* 0.01 0.13 -0.01 0.07 0.00 0.48* 1
12 0.37* -0.22* -0.19* -0.20* -0.08 -0.05 0.04 -0.08 0.13* 0.02 -0.56* 1
13 -0.02 0.09 -0.03 0.02 0.07 -0.05 0.00 -0.03 -0.15* -0.39* -0.40* -0.26* 1
14 0.02 -0.14* -0.13 -0.02 0.02 -0.08 -0.05 0.03 -0.01 -0.35* -0.33* -0.21* -0.15* 1
15 0.18* -0.15* -0.10 0.14* 0.18* 0.05 0.15* 0.23* 0.04 -0.08 0.05 -0.07 -0.10 0.13* 1
16 0.14* -0.16* -0.06 -0.01 0.08 0.08 0.07 -0.01 0.06 -0.03 -0.08 0.07 0.02 0.01 0.10 1
17 -0.02 0.0473 0.04 0.02 -0.03 0.05 -0.02 -0.04 0.01 0.10 0.09 -0.03 -0.04 -0.05 -0.09 0.22* 1
18 0.09 -0.08 -0.03 -0.10 -0.13* -0.05 -0.11 -0.16* 0.00 0.02 -0.09 0.08 -0.04 0.07 -0.41* 0.02 0.02 1
19 0.22* -0.16* -0.24* -0.17* 0.05 0.01 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.15* 0.06 0.05 -0.22* 0.08 0.05 0.07 -0.06 -0.03 1
20 0.03 -0.10 0.02 -0.14* -0.01 -0.05 0.10 0.00 0.17* 0.09 0.01 0.06 -0.08 -0.01 0.05 0.12 -0.11 -0.02 0.21* 1
21 0.36* -0.37* -0.32* -0.15* -0.03 -0.09 -0.04 -0.09 0.11 -0.13* -0.26* 0.24* 0.01 0.07 0.18* 0.15* 0.04 0.10 0.12 0.10 1
22 0.41* -0.38* -0.35* -0.18* 0.09 -0.04 0.02 -0.04 0.08 -0.15* -0.29* 0.26* 0.07 0.02 0.13 0.19* 0.06 0.10 0.11 0.04 0.87* 1
23 -0.06 0.20* 0.13* -0.02 0.00 -0.04 -0.04 -0.01 0.00 -0.09 0.04 -0.10 -0.02 0.11 0.05 -0.17* -0.17* -0.15* -0.03 -0.04 -0.15* -0.13* 1
24 -0.06 0.03 0.09 0.02 0.03 -0.01 -0.13* -0.08 -0.06 0.05 0.08 -0.04 -0.08 0.02 0.10 -0.09 -0.14* -0.18* -0.02 0.10 -0.07 -0.05 0.61* 1
25 -0.11 0.22* 0.14* 0.00 0.01 0.09 -0.11 -0.08 0.01 0.00 0.06 -0.09 0.01 0.03 0.05 -0.15* 0.01 -0.06 0.04 -0.08 -0.06 -0.11 0.10 0.05 1
26 -0.15* 0.23* 0.20* -0.14* -0.14* -0.11 -0.12 -0.04 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.01 -0.03 -0.01 -0.15* -0.13 -0.04 -0.07 -0.07 -0.03 -0.17* -0.17* 0.16* 0.10 0.19* 1
27 -0.18* 0.25* 0.32* -0.10 -0.01 -0.02 -0.04 -0.05 0.04 0.07 -0.01 -0.01 0.07 -0.05 -0.07 0.00 0.06 0.02 -0.29* 0.03 -0.09 -0.13* -0.01 -0.01 0.16* 0.39* 1
28 -0.08 0.03 0.15* -0.09 0.07 -0.06 -0.08 -0.11 0.01 0.08 -0.05 0.08 -0.02 -0.01 -0.09 0.06 -0.12 0.12 -0.06 0.14* 0.03 0.00 0.02 0.08 0.12 0.22* 0.40* 1
29 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.06 0.00 -0.01 0.02 -0.06 -0.02 -0.03 0.00 0.05 0.03 -0.11 -0.26* -0.05 -0.04 0.04 0.02 0.05 -0.07 -0.06 0.06 0.00 0.00 -0.04 -0.03 0.03 1
30 0.00 0.05 0.05 0.04 -0.14* -0.12 -0.06 -0.09 -0.01 -0.02 0.14* -0.10 -0.08 0.02 0.07 -0.05 0.00 0.07 0.01 0.07 -0.05 -0.10 0.18* 0.12 0.08 0.05 0.02 0.10 0.37* 1
31 0.02 -0.10 -0.03 0.00 0.01 0.03 0.03 -0.04 0.04 -0.04 -0.05 0.12 -0.07 -0.01 -0.22* -0.10 -0.07 0.02 -0.07 0.15* -0.07 -0.08 -0.06 -0.04 0.01 0.08 0.03 -0.02 0.57* 0.13* 1
32 0.02 0.03 0.06 0.05 -0.06 -0.07 -0.10 -0.12 0.03 -0.08 0.01 0.05 -0.06 -0.02 0.10 -0.05 0.00 0.10 -0.10 0.12 -0.07 -0.11 0.04 0.07 0.02 0.07 0.13 0.06 0.21* 0.60* 0.33* 1
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Appendix 3 
Notes: The estimation method is Average Treatment Effect on the Treated (Wooldridge, 2002), using heteroscedasticity-robust 
standard errors. Matching covariates include pre-takeover size (employment), prior performance, capital intensity, wage and 
industry. Significance level: ** p<0.01. 
 
 
 
  
Panel A: Full sample
Estimated workforce change 
in Year 1
Estimated workforce change 
by the end of Year 3
Sample Average Treatment effect on the 
Treated (SATT) coefficient
-0.012 -0.003
Matching covariates Yes Yes
Number of matches for each acquirer 4 4
Total number of acquirers 235 206
Total number of matched control firms  470 470
Estimated workforce change 
in Year 1
Estimated workforce change 
by the end of Year 3
Sample Average Treatment effect on the 
Treated (SATT) coefficient
0.044 0.109**
Covariates Yes Yes
Number of matches for each acquirer 4 4
Total number of acquirers 181 146
Total number of matched control firms  470 470
Panel B: Censored sample excluding observations with divestment
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i
 This follows the conventions in the Finance literatures.  Financial and property companies are excluded because 
they are subject to different accounting requirements.  Utilities are subject to special regulatory regimes, including 
the regulation of takeovers.  
ii
 8 of the 11 sectors not present are those have been excluded by the sampling criteria (finance, property, and 
utilities).  The three other sectors are alternative energy, forestry and paper, and tobacco.  There were no takeovers 
in alternative energy in the 1990s. 
iii
 Other sources used include the Times and Sunday Times, Guardian, Independent, Lloyd's List, and the  Observer. 
iv
 In these acquisitions on average 7.82% (median =6.06%) of the combined workforce was reported to be laid off.  
v
 If Datastream stops providing data on an acquirer and if we could not find the relevant annual reports, we assume 
that this acquirer was taken over by another company or had become bankrupt. As a result, the number of 
observations decline during the second and third years.   
vi
 Cadbury required that a majority of non-executives be independent ie. There is no evidence of a business 
relationship with the company or its top executives within five years of appointment 
vii
 Each researcher independently classified the takeovers according to these criteria, and then jointly agreed the 
classification.   
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viii
 The one month premium is used to control for the effect of rumours about takeovers on the target firm share price 
and to determine the true size of the premium paid to target firm shareholders.  Acquirers paid on average a 
premium of 38.57 per cent for their targets, similar to that reported in other UK studies (Sudarsanam and Sorwar 
2010). 
ix
 We also compute employee-weighted average employment change, which gives more weight to the observations 
with larger combined workforce of the target and the acquiring firm. These employee-weighted average change 
computations show that takeovers reduce workforce 3 per cent by the end of Year 1 and 10 per cent by the end of 
Year 3. 
x
 That ROA in the acquirer becomes significantly negative in this specification suggests that these large-scale 
rationalisations occur in takeovers mounted by companies that are themselves under-performers. 
xi
 To clarify the nature of this relationship we experimented with a number of alternative specifications including the 
employment size of both target and acquirer. We found that target firm employment size significantly affects the 
probability of lay-offs, but acquirer employment size is always insignificant when inserted on its own.  It becomes 
significantly negative, however, in conjunction with target employment size.  These findings suggest that 
acquisitions of larger firms have a higher probability of lay-offs and employment reductions, especially where the 
size differential between acquirer and target is relatively smaller.  Executive share ownership continues to be 
significant in these specifications, with the magnitude of coefficients little changed. 
xii
 The Proportion of non-executive directors is not significant in Model 3, where the role of stock options is tested.  
The correlation matrix shows a significant negative inverse correlation between stock options and the proportion of 
executive directors.  These two instruments may be governance substitutes for each other. 
xiii
 Ideally, tests for endogeneity would incorporate two-stage selection or instrumental variables approaches.  
However, our dataset, in which all companies either undergo or mount takeovers, is not suited to this approach. 
